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North Carolina v. EPA, 587 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
Nitrogen oxides ("NOx") that are released into the air can react to
form the pollutant ozone ("03"), which has a harmful impact on the
environment. The release of NOx and the subsequent formation of 03
becomes an interstate issue once the pollutants are in the atmosphere, due
to their susceptibility of being carried downwind into neighboring states.
The EPA established a national ambient air quality standard ("NAAQS")
in order to limit the harmful effects of 03 on the environment. In 1998, the
EPA found that the NOx emissions in Georgia significantly contributed to
nonattainment of the NAAQS in North Carolina. Then in 2004, applying
a revised standard which changed the formula used for measuring 03, the
EPA found that the Georgia emissions levels were within the applicable
standard, and as a result the EPA removed Georgia from its review. This
case arose from the North Carolina's petition for review of the EPA's
ruling to remove the northern part of Georgia from the EPA's regulations
under the NAAQS for 03. Without reaching the merits of North
Carolina's contentions, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that
North Carolina lacked standing - specifically, that it failed to show
redressability.
The court referenced Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlfe in describing
the Article III requirements for standing: injury, causation and
redressability. To sustain a cause of action, first, the plaintiff must have
suffered an "injury in fact" which is "concrete and particularized" and
"actual or imminent." Next, "there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of." Finally, it must be "likely," not
just "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable
decision."
In challenging the legality of government action, North Carolina
asserted that its injury arose from the government's allegedly unlawful
lack of regulation of Georgia. However, North Carolina was not itself the
object of the government action challenged. Citing Lujan, the court noted
that in this situation, "standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily
substantially more difficult to establish."
North Carolina contended that it had standing because it was
unable to attain the NAAQS due to emissions from Georgia. The court
stated that "North Carolina's ability to show redressability hinge[d] on
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showing that including northern Georgia in the NO 3 ... call would result in
reducing emissions from Georgia that significantly contribute to North
Carolina's inability to reach attainment." However, the court determined
that including Georgia in the call would only result in Georgia using its
compliance supplement pool ("CSP") allowances - emissions credits
provided to states to cover excess emissions under certain circumstances in order to avoid actually reducing the state's emissions. Because Georgia
would use the CSP credits and the Georgia emissions would not change,
the effect of those emissions in North Carolina would remain the same.
Therefore, the D.C. Circuit held North Carolina's injury lacked
redressability in that its injury would not be remedied even if the court
were to find in North Carolina's favor. Because North Carolina failed to
show redressability, the court held that North Carolina lacked standing
under the requirements of Article III.
DANIEL

632

S. RICH

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 17, No. 3
Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne,
588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009)
In 2006 the US Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") promulgated
a five-year regulation that allowed for the non-lethal taking of polar bears
and Pacific walrus by oil and gas activities along the Beaufort Sea on the
Northern Coast of Alaska. Prior to issuing the regulation, the Service
evaluated the impact the oil and gas activities would have on polar bears,
and determined that the impact would be negligible. Because of this
finding, the Service prepared an environmental assessment, but not an
environmental impact statement. The assessment concluded that the taking
regulation would likely not impact the population or survival of polar
bears, and that while climate change could affect the degree of impact the
regulation would have on polar bears, the magnitude of the potential effect
was unclear. The district court granted the Defendant's motion for
summary judgment upholding the regulation, and the Plaintiff s appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Two environmental groups, the Center for Biological Diversity and
the Pacific Environment, brought suit against the Service alleging
violations of the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA") and the
National Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA"). The plaintiffs claimed
that the Service did not take into account the weakened state of polar bears
due to climate change, that the finding that the regulation's impact would
be negligible was arbitrary and capricious, and that the Service was
required to file an environmental impact statement regarding the
regulation.
The court first determined the plaintiffs had standing to bring the
claim. Noting that although suing to prevent generalized harm to the
environment is not sufficient to confer standing, the court stated that an
individual's interests in observing a species or a habitat is sufficient to
confer standing, and an organization can assert the interests of its members
by bringing suit. The plaintiffs met the standing requirement because the
members had observed polar bears in the past, had plans to observe them
in the future, and the taking regulations threatened harm to their interests
of continued observation. The injury they asserted was geographically
specific, and because the regulations have been and continue to be
implemented, the potential harm that could occur would be imminent.
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The court also found the plaintiffs action ripe for review, stating
that a facial challenge to an agency's decision, based on whether the
agency's action is arbitrary and capricious, is ripe for review because the
decision would not benefit from further factual development. The court
further held that because the taking letter of authorization lasts for only
five years, and there are inherent delays in litigation, the regulation would
constitute a hardship to the plaintiffs if the court denied review in light of
the potential for irreparable harm to the environment.
Under the MMPA, the Service can authorize regulations to allow
the incidental taking of mammals by those engaging in a specified activity
in a specified geographic area. The regulation in question permitted oil
and gas exploration, development and production in the Beaufort Sea,
which the plaintiffs argued was too broad to qualify as a specify activity
under the MMPA. The court looked at the purpose and definition of
specified activity and stated that the definition was not arbitrary and
capricious because the goal of the definition was in line with the purpose
of the statute: to make sure that anticipated effects are substantially
similar. The court held that the interpretation of the regulation was not
manifestly contrary to the statute and was indeed specific enough, because
the activities defined in the specific regulation were not dissimilar to the
impact if the activity had been more specifically defined.
The plaintiffs also contended that the Service's finding of the
regulation's negligible impact was arbitrary and capricious because it
failed to take into account the impact the oil and gas activities would have
on polar bears that had a weakened physical condition due to climate
change. The government conducted a cumulative effect analysis that
considered the weakened state of polar bears from habitat loss due to such
things as climate change, hunting, oil spills and contaminants, and
concluded that the impact of the regulation would be negligible. A valid
finding of negligible impact requires that the analysis consider those
impacts that are reasonably expected and reasonably likely, but not those
that are speculative or uncertain. Because the Service could not conclude
that the polar bears' reduced physical fitness due to climate change would
be reasonably likely to manifest itself in the context of the regulation's oil
and gas activities, the court held the negligible impact conclusion was not
arbitrary or capricious.
634
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The court also looked at the validity of the regulation under NEPA
requirements. NEPA requires an environmental impact statement for
federal actions that can significantly affect the quality of the human
environment. An environmental assessment is a public document
providing evidence and analysis to determine if there is a need for an
environmental impact statement, or a finding of no significant impact. The
plaintiffs challenged the Service's finding of no significant impact, and
thus no need for an environmental impact statement. Finding that the
environmental assessment considered climate change and the long term
effects on polar bears, as well as inclusion in the letters of authorization in
the regulation of mitigating guidelines to minimize disturbances to
denning female polar bears, the court held the Service did take a hard look
at the potential consequences of the regulation and its determination was
reasonable, and not arbitrary. Because the Service made reasonable
predictions about the regulation's effects based on prior data, and there
uncertainty in their prediction was not high uncertainty, they committed
no clear error in choosing not to produce an environmental impact
statement.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the
Service did take proper consideration of the weakened state of polar bears
due to climate change, that their determination that the regulation's impact
would be negligible was not arbitrary or capricious, and that the Service
was not required to produce an environmental impact statement regarding
the taking regulation.
DANIELLE HOFMAN
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Serv. Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 590 F.3d 545 (2009)
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") may no longer
assess administrative penalties against point sources under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") for failing to timely apply for permits under the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). In Service
Oil, Inc. v. EPA, the Eighth Circuit held that EPA lacks statutory authority
to fine point sources for violating EPA regulations regarding the permit
application process. Rather, EPA may only assess administrative penalties
against point sources after an actual unlawful discharge has occurred.
In April 2002, Service Oil, Inc. ("Service Oil") commenced
construction of a travel plaza in Fargo, North Dakota without first
applying for an individual NPDES permit or obtaining coverage under
North Dakota's general NPDES permit. After a joint inspection of the
construction site by EPA and state health officials revealed that Service
Oil was operating without a permit, Service Oil obtained coverage under
the general NPDES permit in October 2002. Additional investigation by
EPA revealed that Service Oil failed to conduct and record required site
inspections.
Subsequently, EPA commenced an administrative
enforcement action against Service Oil for (1) failing to obtain a permit
prior to beginning construction and (2) failing to comply with the permit
once issued.
EPA initially alleged that Service Oil's failure to obtain a permit
violated §§ 1311(a) and 1342(p) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),
1342(p), as well as EPA regulations regarding permit applications, 40
C.F.R. § 122.26(c). The administrative law judge ("ALJ") denied EPA's
motion for summary judgment because "the failure to obtain an NPDES
permit does not violate § 1311(a) absent proof of a discharge." In order to
circumvent this element of proof, EPA amended its complaint to allege
that Service Oil violated the recordkeeping requirements of the CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1318, as well as EPA regulations requiring that permit
applications be submitted prior to the start of construction, 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.21. Service Oil argued that the authority of § 1318 regarding
recordkeeping did not encompass EPA's permit application regulations.
Thus, EPA should be forced to proceed under the authority of § 13 11(a),
which would require EPA to prove a discharge by Service Oil.
636
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After an administrative hearing, the ALJ agreed with EPA that the
requirements of § 1318 encompassed EPA's regulations requiring point
sources to apply prior to construction. As a result, Service Oil was liable
under Count 1 "regardless of whether EPA proved that a discharge
occurred prior to obtaining coverage under the general permit." The ALJ
assessed a $35,640 penalty against Service Oil, Inc., $27,000 of which was
based on Service Oil's "complete failure to apply for and obtain a NPDES
permit prior to starting construction." The Environmental Appeals Board
("EAB") affirmed the AL's conclusions, and Service Oil appealed.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the EAB's penalty assessment for
abuse of discretion. Its analysis centered on EPA's interpretation of
§ 1318. The issue before the court was "whether the failure to submit a
timely permit application is a violation of § 1318(a)." If, as EPA claimed,
the failure to apply for a permit violated § 1318, then the EAB's penalty
assessment was proper. If, as Service Oil claimed, failing to apply for a
permit is not a violation of § 1318, then "the penalty was based on an
impermissible factor and must be reversed." Thus, the court had to
determine whether the authority for the permit application regulations (the
validity of which were not in question) flowed from § 1318.
The court applied the Chevron doctrine to EPA's interpretation of
§ 1318 as the authority for its permit application regulations. See Chevron
US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
In re Lyons County Landfill, 406 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2005) ("We
consider the agency's interpretation only after finding that the statute is
silent or ambiguous on the question at issue."). The court found the
statute's plain meaning was unambiguous, so it did not reach EPA's
interpretation. The court noted that § 1318 applies to the "owner or
operator of any point source." Because a point source cannot exist
without a discharge, § 1318 cannot supply the statutory authority for
regulations governing pre-discharge conduct. The regulations that EPA
claimed were encompassed by § 1318 govern just such pre-discharge
conduct by requiring persons "proposing a new discharge" to submit a
permit application "before the date on which the discharge is to
commence." Thus, § 1318 does not supply authority for EPA's NPDES
permit application regulations.
Rather, "the obvious authority for EPA's permit application
regulations was its general rule-making authority under § 1361(a)." Under
637
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the CWA, EPA may assess administrative monetary penalties only under
specified provisions listed in § 1319(g)(1). Section 1361 is not one of the
provisions under which EPA may issue fines; therefore, the EAB
impermissibly considered Service Oil's failure to apply for an NPDES
permit in calculating the administrative penalty. Accordingly, the court
vacated the EAB's order and remanded the case for a recalculation of the
proper administrative penalty.
KATIE Jo WHEELER
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River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2010)
The National Park Service ("Park Service") manages a 277-mile
stretch of the Colorado River that traverses the majestic Grand Canyon
National Park. Within that stretch of river is a portion classified as the
Colorado River Corridor ("Corridor") that is regulated by the periodically
revised Colorado River Management Plan ("Management Plan"). The
initial Management Plan was first released in 1979, but its controversial
determination that motorized watercraft should be completely phased out
of the Corridor was directly countermanded by Congress in 1981. As a
result, motorized watercraft remained active in the Corridor and that status
was unaltered by the promulgation of the 1989 Management Plan.
However, in 2002 the Park Service began the preparation of a revised
environmental impact statement ("EIS") for the development of a revised
Management Plan. After receiving thousands of comment submissions,
the Park Service issued a Draft EIS in 2004 and, following additional
hearings and further comments, the Park Service issued its Final EIS in
November 2005. This completed EIS was then integrated into the new
2006 Management Plan at issue in the instant case.
A group of organizations devoted to restoring the wilderness
character of the Grand Canyon (collectively "Plaintiffs") brought suit
alleging that the 2006 Management Plan was arbitrary and capricious
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Plaintiffs based their
complaint on allegations that the 2006 Management Plan violated not only
the Park Service's own policies, but also the National Park Service
Concessions Management and Improvement Act ("Concessions Act") and
the National Park Service Organic Act ("Organic Act"). The district court
subsequently allowed two organizations, representing commercial raft
operators and private rafters respectively (collectively "Interveners"), to
intervene on the side of the Park Service. Following cross motions for
summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
the Park Service and the Interveners.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first determined that the Park
Service's internal policies do not give rise to a legally binding obligation
to maintain the wilderness character of the Grand Canyon. To arrive at
that assessment the court found that the policies in question lacked the
force or effect of law and were not enforceable against the Park Service.
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Applying the two-part test established in United States v. Fifty-Three
Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1982), the court held that the
policies were not substantive rules and failed to conform to certain
procedural requirements. Furthermore, the court noted that the policies
were plainly marked as "guidance documents" and reserved unlimited
discretion for the top Park Service administrators to waive or modify any
policy. Such annotations and discretion, the court reasoned, were
insufficient to show they satisfied the Eclectus Parrotstest. Moreover, the
court disagreed with the Plaintiffs' assertion that the policies required
Chevron analysis. Since the question was not whether the agency had
acted within the realm Congress intended, but was instead whether the
agency had intended to promulgate binding law for itself, the court
maintained that it was exactly the type of question to be decided under
Eclectus Parrots.
The court next found that just because earlier Park Service policies
classified the Corridor as potential wilderness, the 2006 Management
Plan's departure from that language was not arbitrary and capricious.
Federal agencies are entitled to leeway when interpreting their own
policies and regulations and such leeway, the court believed, allows an
agency to change course so long as it supplies a reasoned analysis. The
court viewed the analysis underlying the 2006 Management Plan as
sufficiently reasonable to pass muster.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit held that the 2006 Management Plan was
not arbitrary and capricious in light of either the Concessions Act or the
Park Service's Organic Act ("Organic Act"). The record reflected that the
Park Service adhered to the considerations required by the Concessions
Act and actually chose an alternative that decreased motorized traffic in
the Corridor from pre-2006 levels. Under the Organic Act, the court held
that the Park Service made a reasoned analysis that resulted in findings of
no impediment to free access, nor any impairment of the natural
soundscape of the park. Accordingly, the court held that the Park Service
did not act arbitrarily and capriciously under any of the Plaintiffs' theories
and affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor the Park Service
and interveners.
KAMERON M. LAWSON
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Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Department of
Environmental Quality 226 P.3d 809 (Wyo. 2010)
In 2005, Basin Electric ("Basin") applied to the Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") for an air quality permit
for their proposed Dry Fork Station coal powered power plant. Basin had
to show that this new power plant would not cause significant
deterioration of air quality and would use the best available control
technology to regulate each pollutant emitted. DEQ uses computer
models to determine if a proposed source's emissions would lead to
increment increases in the allowable pollutants in an area. First, DEQ
determines if a proposed source's emissions alone would lead to
Significant Impact Levels. If the source would not lead to Significant
Impact Levels, no further analysis is needed. However, if the source
would lead to Significant Impact Levels, DEQ runs computer models to
determine the combined emissions from the proposed source along with
emissions from other sources to determine if the emissions are below the
maximum allowable increments.
Powder River Basin Resource Council ("PRBRC") claimed that
DEQ improperly granted their permit based on a computer model that
used the maximum actual emissions of another power plant within the
regulated area. The model showed that using actual emissions for the other
source would not lead to Significant Impact Levels, while the model using
the maximum allowable emissions would lead to Significant Impact
Levels. PRBRC noted that the plain language of the permitting statute
clearly requires the permit to be based on calculations using the maximum
allowable emissions of another source. The actual emissions calculation
uses the highest recorded amount a source has emitted, which is usually
significantly lower than the maximum amount the source is allowed to
emit.
The court noted the high differential standard given to permitting
agencies. However, the court stated that although the maximum actual
emissions was allowed to be used in initial testing phase, neither the plain
language of the statue nor precedent allowed for the actual emissions to be
used in calculations for the cumulative or combined phase for determining
if the source exceeds to Significant Impact Levels. Despite this, the court
upheld DEQ issuance of the permit because the regulation gave DEQ the
641
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authority to issue a permit if they predict there will be no impact from the
source and DEQ could reasonably predict, using the actual emission
amounts, that the power plant would not have a detrimental effect on the
air quality.
PRBRC also sought to have the permit held invalid because the
Dry Fork station plans include the use of a "subcritical" boiler to help
control pollution and instead should use a "supercritical" boiler for the
pollution control process. Deferring to DEQ's own interpretation of
Wyoming's Best Available Control Technology ("BACT") Statute, the
court noted that any BACT analysis must consider any control technology
that could be applied to the proposed facility and that the facility does not
need to add a control technology that would require such redesign of the
facility. In conclusion, the court held that use of a "subcritical" boiler was
a reasonable pollution control technology and that ordering the
"supercritical" boiler be used would require an improper redesign of the
facility.
JOHNATHAN
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Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk County, 600 F.3d 180 (2nd Cir. 2010)
Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. ("Baykeeper") brought suit against
Suffolk County and the Suffolk County Department of Public Works
("County") under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). Baykeeper alleged that the County violated provisions of the
CWA by applying certain pesticides and dredging mosquito ditches in
order to combat the spread of mosquito-borne illnesses. In addition to
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, Baykeeper also asked for the
imposition of civil penalties against the County, which would be paid to
the United States Treasury. The district court entered judgment for the
county, finding that none of the County's actions violated the CWA.
Baykeeper appealed.
Baykeeper's first contention on appeal was that the County's
spraying of pesticides violated the CWA. Specifically, Baykeeper argued
that the County sprayed the pesticides in a manner inconsistent with its
labeling, which violated the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). The Environmental Protection Agency
issued a Final Rule in 2005 stating that any application of pesticides
consistent with FIFRA requirements does not require a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. An NPDES permit is
required for anyone to violate the provisions of the CWA. Thus,
Baykeeper's argument was that since the County did not spray in a manner
consistent with the label, it violated the FIFRA. That violation required the
County to obtain a NPDES, which it did not do, thereby violating the
CWA. The court found that there was sufficient evidence that the County
had sprayed pesticides over a creek, and since the district court had not
fully explained its finding that the County complied with the FIFRA
requirements, the case should be remanded for further fact-finding.
The Second Circuit also addressed the district court's independent
basis for finding all spraying activities lawful under the CWA. The district
court held that the applicators attached to the County's trucks and
helicopters were not "point sources" because they discharged pesticides
into the air, thus any discharge into the water would have been indirect.
The Second Circuit disagreed, saying that even though the pesticides
traveled from the air into the water, the pesticides were still being
discharged from the applicators, making the applicators a "point source."
643
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Baykeeper's second contention was that the County's dredging of
mosquito ditches constituted "dredged spoil" under the CWA, and thus
their discharge into navigable waters was unlawful without a permit. The
district court said there was no evidence that the County had dug any new
mosquito ditches, and that under the CWA a permit was not required for
the old ditches, so the County's dredging activities did not violate the
CWA. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court, since the CWA
has a permit exception for the maintenance of drainage ditches and the
purpose of the County's ditches was to drain surface waters.
The court ultimately held that further fact-finding was needed in
order to decide if the County's spraying activities were in compliance with
the FIFRA requirements, that the trucks and helicopters used by the
County to spray pesticides were "point sources" under the CWA, and that
the County's dredging activities did not violate the CWA.
THOMAS C. SMITH
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Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation,
601 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2010)
An action brought by environmental groups under the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA") in response to two biological opinions ("B.O.")
issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") concerning effects of
federal water projects on endangered minnows raised jurisdictional
questions under the Article III doctrine of mootness. The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants, the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") and Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), failed to consult with the FWS regarding all
discretionary aspects of the water projects that were required by the ESA
and sought injunctive and declaratory relief for this error. The
environmental groups sought an injunction ordering a full consultation
between the Bureau and the FWS. The argument escalated to an extended
legal battle over water rights in the Rio Grande River. The crux issue is
whether the Bureau had discretion to reallocate water from agricultural to
municipal contract users to maintain stream flows for the benefit of the
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow.
The district court found that the consultation between the Bureau
and the FWS was required under the ESA, but also affirmed the 2002 B.O.
on substantive grounds. The 2002 B.O. indicated that the reclamation's
operations in the Rio Grande River Valley were likely to jeopardize the
minnow, but that there were no reasonable alternatives. The Corps, the
Bureau and, the water users subsequently filed an appeal. The court of
appeals dismissed the water users' claim for lack of standing. The court of
appeals also declared that the appeal of both agencies was not subject to
interlocutory review, and subsequently dismissed their appeal. After the
dismissal the FWS issued a new 2003 B.O. that superseded the previous
one. The 2003 B.O. also concluded that the minnow would likely be
jeopardized, but suggested reasonably prudent alternatives.
Both agencies voluntarily ceased their objectionable behaviors
after the superseding B.O. was issued. At that point, the environmental
groups sought dismissal, but requested that the district court not vacate its
previous orders. The Bureau, Corps, and water users moved for vacature.
Even though they voluntarily ceased their actions, the Corps and Bureau
maintained that the scope of their discretion was very narrow and that the
voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine was not applicable.
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The court of appeals agreed with the defendants, holding that the Bureau
was not required to consult with the FWS and that the earlier district court
order should be vacated. The court also noted that there was no evidence
that the agencies used the issuance of the superseding B.O. to moot the
environmental groups' case, and that any injury in connection with the
prior opinions could not have survived the issuances of the 2003 B.O.
JESSICA R. ADAMS
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